Politics of capacity for…not criticism

Genneh Y. Moriba 20 /1/2007

Sierra Leoneans are eager to know what the political parties have for them come July 28 elections and after, as they should be voting in the party (ies) with the best programmes and leaders with proven abilities to translate such programmes into reality. This bring to the fore the question of leadership.

The type of leader(s) a party presents should be symbolic of the party's intentions, passion, genuine intentions and commitment to right the wrongs in our society. With the exception of the PMDC who has an interim executive, the other two prominent political parties (SLPP and APC) have elected their leaders and party executives.

However, this does not obviate the need to establish and examine the yardsticks to appoint running mates. One thing political parties, their leaders and every Sierra Leonean should bear in mind is that the epilogue and its effects of bad leaders spell sinister consequences.

Cognisant of this fact, and from lessons learnt from recent happenings in the history of this country, Sierra Leoneans have arisen from their political slumber and are asking for action/change. “What really distinguishes this generation from earlier generations is its determination to act, its joy in action, the assurance of being able to change things by one's own efforts”.

We are the change we want to see in our country. We want party leaders to be mindful of this and be careful when appointing running mates, not only to satisfy their parties' stalwarts but choose a person that the ordinary Sierra Leonean appreciates. That of course depend largely on his/her demonstrated ability to deliver to the people.

Party leaders should appoint running mates on the basis of merit and not affiliation, a person who wins the confidence of the ordinary man. This will either chances of winning the elections or mar them. Sierra Leoneans cannot be contented to wait and see what will happen come July 28 2007, but are determined to make the right things happen.

Party leaders have to be alive to see these nuances and make a wise decision. A resolute determination is the truest wisdom. The party leader should detach himself from pressures coming from his kiths and kins; friends and sympathizers. He must constantly be on top of events. If he hesitates events will be on top of him. He should never let up for a single moment.

I advise party leaders, especially the leader of the SLPP to disqualify all those individual(s) who have gone ahead campaigning for the position of running mate. Their works should have distinguished them by now.

Sierra Leone wants a person with tremendous adeptness to bring programmes/policies into fruition/reality. The most successful person in his/her field of work is the most fitted for running mate in Sierra Leone . Those campaigners are not sure of their successes. “Success is peace of mind which is a direct self-satisfaction in knowing you did your best to become the best you are capable of becoming.”

We are encouraging party leaders especially Solo-B, whose party members have started campaigning, to be steadfast in his/their conviction of who he/they believe is the best person to work with. One who can transform dreams into reality, and not succumb to the dictates of sympathizers, superiors and party elders.

This is party politics of advancement. Progress in every age results only from the fact that there are some men and women who refuse to believe that what they know to be right cannot be done. Leaders should work with precision, decision and determination which constitute the engines of the train of opportunity and success.

“Where the willingness is great, the difficulties cannot be great.”

 

US $ 37 billion Debt relief for poor nations : World Bank to decide Sierra Leone 's fate

Tanu Jalloh 15/1/2006

World Bank is preparing to cancel billions of dollars of debt owed to it by many of the world's poorest nations. But the world's financial institution says it is yet to decide on the fate of Sierra Leone and two others.Sierra Leone , Guinea and Guinea Bissau have been rated as the poorest West African countries which debt relief is currently being negotiated for full cancellation by the World Bank.After years of wrangling, agreement, sometime last year, was reached at Gleneagles , Scotland to write off most of the debts of some 38 “highly indebted poor countries”, including those owed to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

The summit established that in order to qualify, countries must pass a series of economic hurdles including meeting strict criteria under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. So far only around 19 countries have qualified for full debt relief.Meanwhile, these countries which will receive full cancellation of their eligible debt are Benin , Bolivia , Burkina Faso , Cameroon , Ethiopia , Ghana , Guyana , Honduras , Madagascar , Mali , Mauritania , Mozambique , Nicaragua , Niger , Rwanda , Senegal , Tanzania , Uganda and Zambia .Some $37bn in debt relief will be provided to these countries starting July 1, 2007 sequel to agreements reached at last year's historic G8 summit in Scotland .Leaders at the gathering in Gleneagles pledged to cancel the debts of many of world's poorest countries, most of which are in Africa .The move will provide debt relief to the countries over the next 40 years.Some $17bn of debt relief has already been committed by the International Development Association arm of the World Bank.World Bank's President, Paul Wolfowitz said commitments from leading donor nations meant wider debt relief could now be implemented.

Students' violence aggrieves Njala Principal

Mohamed Massaquoi 3/7/2006

Principal and Vice Chancellor of Njala University, Professor MA Alghali Friday registered his displeasure over the continuous students' lawlessness in higher institutions of learning in the country.Prof. Alghali was addressing a two-day clinic on Education For the Culture of Peace organized by the Directorate of Planning Research and Development at the Njala University .“What we are now seeing is lawlessness within the society and this issue has been extended to higher institutions of learning,” he said, adding lawless activities, which have erupted among students across the country is an unfortunate situation, as educational institutions are meant to bring up responsible people in society.”Students should be very conscious in carrying out their club activities, as clubs were established for social interactions but it has been transformed into violence. People violate the rights of others by imposing their will forcefully on them. We are trying to see how we can enforce student unionism at Njala University ,” Prof. Alghali pledged.

He maintained that education is a way to move people from ignorance to a decent way of live and encouraged students to take the workshop very seriously, as they are the ambassadors of their colleagues who were not present for the workshop.Participants were able to identify the cases of lawlessness among students at university, which includes students' welfare, payment of granting aid, student/lectures relationship, misuse of university facilities and examination malpractices.Participants were drawn from Njala University Student Union Bo Campus and Freetown respectively.

SLSA launches Trust Fund

Ibrahim Tarawallie 3/7/2006

Sierra Leone Scouts Association (SLSA), Saturday launched a Trust Fund at the Sierra Leone Library Board, Rokel Street .The Fund is for the Third West African Scouts Zonal Conference scheduled to hold in September 2006.Chairperson of the session, Melrose Totti said the launching is an auspicious occasion. She maintained SLSA has been doing well in its activities and advised that they continue with the good work.Chief Commissioner, Ezekiel Duramany Lakkoh said SLSA members have proven to be on top of issues and are the highest trained scout movements in West Africa . He said they are working with Global Fund to set up an HIV/AIDS sensitization campaign.

Chairman for the third West African Zonal Conference, Amara Kallon said they have written a project proposal for street kids, which has been approved. He said since the association was formed, the September forum would be the first conference to be held in Sierra Leone .“The conference would look at the training of commissioners in the country. Each country is required to send five participants for the conference. In all we would be having 65 participants,” he said, adding that the money required to host the conference is Le 55 million.Head of Mission in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs, Georgiana Benedict said the West African Bureau and SLSA are jointly organizing the conference.

She maintained that a separate bank account should be opened for transparency and accountability and advised SLSA to be committed and dedicated to its work.Formerly launching the Fund, Vice President of SLSA, Reverend Christopher Samuel described the occasion as unique one. He called on goodwill organizations to assist SLSA so that the conference will be successful.

Who's Next?

Issac Massaquoi 14/6/2006

Not too long on the Front-Page program of Radio UNIOSIL, I argued that criminals are talking over the streets and that the police were increasingly becoming incapable of dealing with the situation. For the whole week following that program, the state propaganda machine was in overdrive, telling the public that journalists were alarmist and that their utterances were driving away investors. Once again, this was the state running rings of cynicism around its own people.Today, who can deny that gradually Sierra Leone is sliding into an unbelievable cycle of lawlessness that can only be compared to the days when Johnny Paul Koroma's genocidal forces held sway in Freetown ?Let me state from the outset that the authority of the state is being seriously tested on a daily basis and for purely political reasons, the government is refusing to deal with this festering cancer that threatens the very existence of the ordinary Sierra Leonean in the midst of such pervading ignorance and grinding poverty.If the state concludes again that this is just another alarmist conspiracy to make it look bad, then let me ask the following questions; how else can we explain the bringing down of police posts at Waterloo and Mile 91 without consequences? How else can we explain, the destruction and stealing of the people's investment at Milton Margai College of Education and Technology? How else can we explain the series of unsolved murders, from Lake Sonfon Guest house in Freetown to Deima guesthouse in Kenema? Indeed, how else can we explain the brutal killing of Kenneth Moore, the senior lands ministry official who in the last few days was kidnapped and murdered, in a manner that made the horrific elimination of Samuel Doe, the former president of Liberia , look like some mercy killing?

On the same program a couple of weeks back, I drew attention to the fact that thugs have been employed by senior government officials, some of them permanent Secretaries and instructed to violently attack, maim or kill people carrying out the orders of the state. From what I now know, no action was taken.Today we have a murder that puts the whole nation to shame on our hands on the same spot to which I called the government's attention in that program. Here was a man doing the job given to him by the state, he was captured, Columbia-style by criminals, as the security arrangement around him catastrophically collapsed. Once again the state has failed in its primary responsibility. This time the victim is Kenneth Moore.Just a few days before this incident, more than 60 Sierra Leoneans died trying to cross the estuary between Freetown and Lungi. We know that there exists a clear case of criminal negligence on the part of the boat owners and maritime authorities but it appears as if nobody is willing to do anything about that.

In Sierra Leone toady, everything is seen in political terms. Pupils beat up their principal and burn down police station and because of the political sensitivity of Mile 91 to one of the most reclusive politicians in this country, almost like Mullar Omar of the Taliban, no action! Million of Leones worth of building materials bought with tax payers' money is stolen and destroyed, no action! Over sixty of our people thrown into the sea by a boat that fails all maritime tests, no action!The death of Kenneth Moore provides this government with an excellent opportunity to prove that it is really in charge. If the government decides to be timid, not wanting to rock the boat ahead of the 2007 elections, then we are heading for a situation where petty warlords would appear all over Freetown, with their militia, just like that permanent secretary in the Hill top area at the back of the Old School night club whose thugs are led by an attack dog called Henry.

GUINEA : The Next Crucible of Implosion in West Africa ?

Emmanuel Abalo 14/6/2006

Lately political observers and the diplomatic community have increasingly voicedtheir frustrations over the “stale political climate” obtaining in the West Africanation of Guinea , which is a part member of the regional Mano River Union groupingof Liberia and Sierra Leone . The sub region and its economic and political systemsis just emerging from a crippling and horrendous civil war which claimed nearly 2million people in casualty and refugee displacements in the last decade plus years.Guinea , led by strong man General Lansana Conte who has wielded an iron grip onpower for the last two decades, has remained relatively “stable” in the region andeven supported and participated in peacekeeping efforts in neighboring Liberia andSierra Leone . But with this relative “stability” has come an unbearable price -political and economic stagnation, one party and dictatorial rule and poverty inthis predominantly Muslim country.Guinea has had only two presidents since independence from France in 1958. GeneralConte rose to power in 1984 when the military seized the government after the deathof the first president Ahmed Sekou Toure.Guinea did not hold democratic elections until 1993 when the Guinean General who washead of the military government was elected president of the civilian government.

Mr. Conte was re-elected in 1998 and again in 2003. Instability in neighboringSierra Leone and Liberia has spilled over into Guinea on several occasions over thepast decade, threatening stability, creating humanitarian emergencies and stretchingthat country's meager resources.International estimates in 2006 put refugees from Guinea 's neighbors of Liberia ,Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire at about 141,000.In the Liberian conflagration exacerbated by the rebel Liberian United for Democracy(LURD) onslaught on the Charles Taylor Administration, it was common knowledge thatthe rebels had training and support from the Guinean government, something that theConte Administration has officially denied.The growing concern of an implosion in Guinea stems from the overwhelmingfrustration Guineans have endured since independence ranging from an effectiveconcentration of power in the Presidency to widespread corruption, non-transparencyin government and devastating poverty. The Guinean government has yet to addresstroubling issues of:-Restrictions on the right of citizens to change their government-Unlawful killings by security forces-Beatings and abuse of civilians, particularly detainees, by security forces-Inhumane and life threatening prison conditions-Impunity arbitrary arrest and prolonged pretrial detention-Executive influence in the judiciary infringements on citizens' privacy rights andviolence and discrimination against women among others.

In its 2005 Human Rights report on Guinea , the U. S. State Department charged that“…Corruption remained widespread throughout society, including in the executive,legislative, and judicial branches. The president holds powers to overrulelegislative decisions and did so in practice. Connection to the president or hispowerful associates sometimes conferred exemptions from taxes and other fiscalobligations. Public funds were diverted for private use or for illegitimate publicuses, such as buying expensive vehicles for government workers. Land sales andbusiness contracts lacked transparency.”The U.S. State Department report further maintained that “…the [Guinean] governmentand the World Bank published a critical report on corruption in the country duringthe year. Using polling data gathered in 2003, the report identified governmentagencies widely viewed as corrupt by citizens. It also identified how corruption affected everything from commercial transactions to judicial decision to civil service promotion… Businessmen, government workers, and average citizens were among the hundreds of persons surveyed in the study…”Although the President Conte has been quietly pressured intensely by the international and donor communities to institute meaningful national reforms in allaspects of government, he continues to consolidate power. Quite recently, the ailing Guinean leader reshuffled his cabinet and surrounded himself with long time allies - a well known gimmick employed by most dictators to perpetuate themselves in state power. The political opposition, student and teachers unions have been effectively marginalized and made somewhat inconsequential through broad governmental laws, financial restrictions and control and sometimes naked force. By the way, government employees are required to campaign for the ruling Party for Unity and Progress of President Conte in each election.

The malaise in Guinea , has, on several occasions, including the past week, erupted in political protests and student demonstrations during which the government security forces violently put down the unrests fearing a popular people uprising. In a more serious incident, in January and February of 2005, the government detained approximately 60 civilians and military officers for suspected involvement in an “assassination attempt” on President Conte. If this incident is true, it then represents an ugly by-product of an endemic lack of good governance and justice which Guineans crave and deserve. It goes without saying, however, that Guineans should never employ the prescription of violent and unconstitutional change of state government to address political, economic and social inequities. Guineans continue to view their national leadership though a narrow perspective of mistrust and have all but given up on hopes for a redemption or modification of the political status quo. The clash of the ideology of the “Guinean Old Guards” representing over two decades of one party rule and patronage and the young, ambitious, free- thinking and western-influenced populace is headed for a show-down sooner than later. The ordinary Guinea sees no clear, peaceful process of political succession and is genuinely fearful that with the inevitable exit or demise of President, the military will again forcibly seize the opportunity to fill the state leadership vacuum and pursue the recipe of military-turned-civilian governance for the foreseeable future. This scenario, for ordinary Guineans, negatively impacts their view of “democracy Guinean style.”

New Possibilities and Opportunities for Peaceful Transition: The profound ideals of a peaceful transition of political and democratic reforms in Guinean remain a challenge but are still achievable. Although a Guinean constitutional succession is on the “books”, no one believes that the process would be followed. President Conte should now seize the present opportunity to clear up any confusion of succession, guarantee future stability and preserve some kind of legacy for himself. It is quite obvious that the liability and dilemma for the Guinean strong-man President Conte is how and when to “step away” without fear of prosecution for would be crimes and an accountability of his two decades of governance. Unsure of how to resolve this matter, President Conte “powers” on. Many long time African leaders also have this dilemma. This is where a face-saving mechanism would be welcomed.

Along with the opposition, President Conte should now adopt a comprehensive and implement able methodology of forming a true National Unity Government, arranging internationally sanctioned free and fair elections and voluntarily stepping aside.This coalition vehicle of transitional administration would pay big national “dividends” if the political actors - government and opposition - agree to credibly commit themselves to a set of national policies rather than their own political agenda.This comprehensive transitional process should also ensure that at the end of the day the Guinean military would recognize its role as the protector of national sovereignty, accept and respect the will of the people to freely choose genuine civilian governance without fear of another “military hijacking of state power.”

About the Author:

Emmanuel Abalo is an exiled Liberian journalist, media and human rights activist. He is a former Acting President of the Press Union of Liberia (PUL). Mr. Abalo presently resides in Pennsylvania , USA and works as an analyst with CITIGROUP, North America .

What the TRC report says about Youths

Introduction 14/6/2006

1. In Sierra Leone , the youth is the lifeblood of the nation. EverySierra Leonean between the ages of 18 and 35 years old is considered tobe a youth. According to a government paper of 2003, youths constituteforty-five percent of the country's estimated 4.5 million population.

2. In the conflict, youths were both victims and perpetrators of humanrights violations on a massive scale. It was a dual role to whichyouths had become accustomed in post-independence Sierra Leone: on theone hand, they were abused; on the other hand they became the abusers.In the 1970s and 1980s, as the one-party system became increasinglytyrannical, youths formed the only viable opposition to the ruling AllPeople's Congress (APC) because the other political parties had beenco-opted and assimilated into the government. When institutions andtheir leaders in so many sectors of society failed to speak out againstthe injustices of the APC regime, invariably it was the voice of youththat called for accountability. Conversely, though, youths were oftenthe instruments of oppression, acting as vicious thugs to influence theoutcomes of elections and put down anti-government demonstrations. Intimes of transition, Sierra Leone 's youth has always struggled to findits rightful place in society.

3. Testimonies received by theCommission indicate that the majority of participants in the war wereyouths. Many of them were children at the time of their recruitment.Others joined voluntarily in protest against the social and politicalills of the day, or in the name of defending their communities. Theyall lost their youth to a career of fighting and violence. Some are nowexporting their combat “expertise” to neighbouring countries inconflict. The experiences and prospects of youth in Sierra Leonerequire careful consideration.

4. In the course of the war,youths committed brutal and malicious acts against their familymembers, communities and fellow Sierra Leoneans. Their experiencesduring the war have disrupted their lives and traumatised them. Manyyouths are currently drifting without direction, unable to accesseducation or employment. Some are so disillusioned with theirenvironment that they are desperately seeking a way out and wouldreadily resort once more to violence.

5. Sierra Leone faces thedaunting task of reclaiming a “lost generation” of youth. The “youthquestion” is therefore central to lasting peace and development in thecountry. This examination of youth participation in the war will enablethe Commission to make detailed recommendations on how to respond tothe challenges created by misguided youth in the past and how torestore youths as productive members of their communities.

6. Inhis statement to the Commission, Brima Vandy, who was 30 years old atthe start of the conflict in 1991, made this confession:“When Iwas in the bush… I committed many violations and abuses. I killedinnocent people, took away their property by force… asked them to leavetheir houses for me to sleep inside… and forced their women to makelove to me.”

7. In her testimony to a closed hearing of the Commission, a young woman in the Koinadugu District told of her experiences:“Uponour arrival (at their base) we were distributed to different rebels tobecome their wives… when we refused, they flogged us. We were raped bytwo or three men daily… when we fought back, they threatened to killus. We eventually got married to them. They gave us drugs likemarijuana to smoke. When the roads were free, we pleaded for them torelease us to go back to our relatives… but they refused. CommanderSofila pleaded with them to release us but they threatened to kill usif we tried to escape. Commander CO Ray inscribed RUF on our bodies.They looted properties whilst we carried their ammunitions.”

8. Similar narratives by youths, both as victims and perpetrators, aboundin the testimonies, statements and interviews gathered by theCommission. In addition, the youth question has stimulated considerableanalysis and debate among academics and writers on the conflict. OneSierra Leonean historian, Ibrahim Abdullah, has described the war asthe high point of a rebellious Freetown youth culture of “rarray mandem” that started in the 1940s. Another Sierra Leonean historian,Ishmael Rashid, has detected a strong impetus for the war in theconvergence that took place in the 1970s and 1980s between these rarrayman dem and groups of radical students influenced by leftistideologies. British anthropologist Paul Richards has traced the causeof the war to a patrimonial crisis, sidelined intellectuals, violentfilms and a desire by youths to manage the resources of the rain forestmore equitably. Finally Jimmy Kandeh, a Sierra Leonean politicalscientist, has noted that the atrocities committed by youths during thewar stemmed from the “subaltern” appropriation of what was previouslythe violence of the elites.

9. Combining these perspectives, itis possible to build a picture of the origins of violent behaviouramong youths. Members of the political elite deployed “subalterns”, orrarray man dem, to silence their opponents during the days of the APCone-party state. Youths learned violence from their masters anddeveloped violent reactions to the injustices and frustrations theyencountered in their daily lives. As the conflict arrived, youths usedbrutality not to prop up the political elites, but to accumulateresources and power that had been denied to them previously, attackingthe very foundations of the elites' society. The major differencebetween elite-orchestrated violence and subaltern violence, however,was that the latter made no distinction between public and privateproperty. The violence of the youths was largely indiscriminate.

10. This chapter builds on these perspectives and makes use of submissions,testimonies and interviews gathered by the Commission to analyse andreport on: the nature, causes and extent of the violations and abusesperpetrated and suffered by youths; the context of these violations;and the impact on of the conflict on youths. The chapter concludes byconsidering current interventions geared towards addressing the youthquestion in Sierra Leone .

Youth Categories and Violence

11. Youth in Sierra Leone can be roughly divided into two categories:mainstream and marginalised youths. These categories can be furthersub-divided to take into account the geographical locations andassociated characteristics of youths. Thus there are mainstream urbanyouths and mainstream rural youths. The same distinction can also bemade for marginalised youths.

12. The defining characteristic ofmainstream urban youths has always been their access to formalwestern-type education. They would typically be secondary school oruniversity students, expected to take up white-collar jobs uponcompletion of their studies. They belong to the world of the lawabiding - those who play by the rules. Rural mainstream youths equallyabide by long-standing traditions. They respect their elders and workon the farms.

13. In Freetown before the conflict, there was aparticular category of marginalised youths, referred to above as therarray man dem. They constituted a predominantly male-specific,oppositional sub-culture, prone to violence and other anti-socialbehaviour such as drug dealing, petty theft and riotous conduct. Mostlyilliterates, they were economically insecure. They survived by movingin and out of casual jobs as domestic hands, night watchmen andlabourers. They lived on the margins and were alienated from mainstreamsociety. The violence they committed was mainly within their potes(enclaves or ghettos for marginalised youth) and on festive occasionswhen they moved around the city with their “masquerades”, orprocessions, known as odelay. Their violence mainly involved chuk(stabbing with a knife) and was of a non-political nature.

14. The utilisation of the violence of marginalised youths for politicalpurposes started with the 1969-1970 by-elections, when the APC ralliedsoldiers, the police and rarray man dem to intimidate members of theopposition SLPP. The rarray man dem were mobilised by the APC strongmanS. I. Koroma, who later became Vice President after the promulgation ofthe Republican Constitution in 1971. Koroma's cynical tacticstransformed rarray man dem into “thugs”.

15. In the common parlanceof Sierra Leone at the time, “thugs” came to mean youths who wereutilised for political violence. The word “youth” itself became asynonym for the unemployed young person who was vulnerable tomanipulation. Youths were considered to be auxiliary troops forpolitical parties. During elections, or crises, they did the dirty workfor the politicians. Payment was often made in the form of drugsupplies or token cash handouts. The violence offered youths an outletfor acting out their machismo, which although loathed by society wasencouraged by the political elites.

16. A few leaders of therarray man dem were eventually rewarded with high positions (one wasmade a minister, another an ambassador), but most thugs wereunceremoniously dumped after the completion of their violentassignments. The majority of youths remained unskilled and impoverished.

17. In the provinces, marginalised youths were known as “san san boys” and“njiahungbia ngornga”. San san boys were marginalised youths eking outa living in the “sandpits” of the diamond mines. Most of them neverfulfilled their dreams of becoming wealthy through diamonds. Instead,they became part of a harsh, greedy and adventurous way of life. Laterthey became easy prey as recruits for the purveyors of state andcounter-state violence.

18. “Njiahungbia ngornga” is a Mendephrase meaning unruly youth. This group included semi-literate youthsin the provinces who loathed traditional structures and values. Theysaw “the rebellion as an opportunity to settle local scores and reversethe alienating rural social order in their favour.” Freetown youthsreferred to the marginalised youths of the provinces who had adoptedFreetown lifestyles and world-views as bonga rarray man dem or uplinesavis man dem.

The Increasing Marginalisation of Youths and the Convergence of Educated and Uneducated Youths

19. The country's deteriorating economic and politicalsituation from the 1970s onwards saw an increase in the number ofschool dropouts. Education was no longer a right for all, but aprivilege for the few. Employment and the grant of governmentscholarships were dependent on APC party allegiance and what SierraLeonean youths referred to as “connectocracy”, meaning personalconnections to a political patron or senior public servant. Most youthscould never fulfil their ambitions because they were not “connected” tothe political system. Only the wealthy could provide a reasonableeducation for their children. The children of politicians andgovernment officials attended private schools, often travellingoverseas, while the government schools were totally neglected. Thenumber of school dropouts increased annually as the education systemdeteriorated, swelling the ranks of the marginalised youths in thepotes.

20. In the provinces, traditional political and judicialauthorities served the interests of the local elites. Politicalmarginalisation and harsh judicial penalties for the breaching oftraditional norms pushed many youths to the margins of their societies.Some youths in provincial urban settings like Bo and Kono also set uppotes akin to those of their Freetown counterparts.

21. Thestagnating economy increased the numbers of even well educated youthswho could not find employment. Western-type education no longerguaranteed employment. Graduates found themselves exposed to the sameharsh economic realities that had long been experienced by theuneducated marginalised urban youth.

22. This convergence of thematerial conditions of educated (mainstream) and uneducated(marginalised) youths provided a basis for the convergence of theirlifestyles and world-views. Many of the educated but unemployed youthsstarted frequenting the potes. Unemployment induced in them the habitsof the marginalised youth. They were frowned upon by mainstreamsociety, but their visits to the potes gradually elevated their socialstatus amongst their uneducated peers. With the increase in the numberof marginalised youths came a corresponding increase in the number ofpotes. The peddling of drugs became a form of full-time employment formany youths. University students also joined the drift to the potes.Student activists began establishing potes on their campuses and thedrug culture started to gain a grudging acceptance in the society - itbecame a sine qua non for radicalism and non-conformity.

23. Thenewcomers to the potes were au fait with unfolding world events andwere more politically conscious than the original marginalised youths.Many had read revolutionary texts from which they had developed newpolitical ideas. They took it upon themselves to “conscientise” their“less fortunate brothers” while in return they were themselvesgradually absorbing and adopting the style and language of the “ghetto”.

24. This transformation was also influenced by contemporary music,particularly reggae music by Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Bunny Wailer.The lyrics of their songs depicted realities of the day - hardship,degradation and oppression - in a style of social commentary known as“system dread”.

25. The new groups emerging out of the fusion ofeducated youths and their uneducated peers in the potes were notinvolved in petty theft or political thuggery, at least at first. Thepotes became rallying points for alienated, unemployed youths and anarena for political discussion centred on the corrupt practices of thedominant political class and the stifling political atmosphere underone-party dictatorship.Repression of Student Demonstrations in the 1970s and 1980s and the Evolution of Revolutionary Thinking

26. Student leaders were conversant in theories ofliberation and spiced up their discussions with quotes fromrevolutionaries like Kwame Nkrumah, Marcus Garvey, Wallace-Johnson,Fidel Castro, Malcolm X and Steve Biko. Students and school leaversread extensively and intensively outside their fields of study in orderto contribute meaningfully to philosophical debates and discussionsthat lasted far into the night. Another significant influence was thepresence of refugees from Zimbabwe , South Africa and Namibia on almostall campuses. Their experiences as freedom fighters made theminfluential in student circles and they occupied leadership positionsin some student union executives.

27. Student thinking and thecampus climate were ripe for protest action. Hindolo Trye was electedpresident of the Fourah Bay College (FBC) student union in 1976. Thestudent motto “The Self” implied the importance of self-esteem anddignity, the awareness of the right to liberate oneself and the rightof the collective self to initiate liberation. The students' firstdirect confrontation with the APC came in 1977, when President Stevenswas humiliated while delivering his speech at the annual universityconvocation ceremony.

28. The APC organised acounter-demonstration involving rarray man dem led by Kemoh Fadika.Supported by the armed Special Security Unit (SSD), these youths werebrought in to flog, rape and brutalise students. The deployment of sucha force foreshadowed events to come during the conflict, when youthswere pitched against youths in an orgy of violence. The government'sbacklash led to a nationwide demonstration by students in February 1977following the arrest of their student leader Hindolo Trye. According toone participant:“They sent thugs and members of theparamilitary to beat us up. They destroyed the campus, which led to anational uprising led by the students and sparked up by schoolchildren. It is what we called the “no college, no school”demonstration. It spread countrywide and became a national uprising,which lasted for several weeks.'”

29. The student protests, plannedand led by radical students, received popular support and forcedPresident Stevens to make certain concessions. A general election wascalled three months later. Violence by APC-sponsored rarray man demresulted in a massive electoral victory for the APC. The hopes of theeducated youths for an opening up of the political system were dashed.

30. The 1980s saw the emergence of well-organised radical groups and studyclubs on university and college campuses, including the Green Bookstudy club (promoting Ghaddafi's ideas of revolutionary massparticipation from Libya ), the Pan African Union (PANAFU), which calledfor a popular movement, and the Socialist Club. Unlike other campusclubs, PANAFU brought both categories of youth together and wasconcerned with educating its members about apartheid in South Africaand neo-colonialism in Africa . PANAFU operated outside the campuses andhad revolutionary “cells” in central and eastern Freetown .

31. Following a student demonstration in 1984, the Fourah Bay Collegecampus was closed down for three months and upon resumption of classes,students had to sign an agreement for re-admission into the university.This repressive act helped “contain” students and brought relative calmto campus. Then, in 1985, Alie Kabba, a keen member of several radicalclubs, was returned unopposed as president of FBC student union on aplatform of collective self-advancement that he referred to as“we-ism”. Kabba's student union executive made no secret of itsintentions to put its radical leftist ideologies into practice once inpower. The student leadership was constantly at loggerheads with theuniversity authorities, who perceived Kabba as a subversive firebrand.

32. Events reached a climax at the end of the second term in 1985 whenstudents refused to hand in their dormitory keys. The authoritiesaccused them of planning to bring in Libyan mercenaries to oust the APCgovernment. The paramilitary SSD, again called in to put the studentsin their place, used undue force in restraining the students andbeating them into submission.

33. The SSD's actions gave rise toa Freetown-wide demonstration. When the college reopened for the thirdsemester in April 1985, forty-one students were declared ineligible toregister, among them Alie Kabba. The student union protested againstthis decision. The campus demonstration spread to the city centre,where shops were looted and vehicles burnt down, apparently byunemployed youths who used the political demonstration of the studentsas a chance to wreak havoc and enrich themselves. Such opportunism, tomany differing degrees, would become a constant feature of the conflictin the 1990s.

34. Alie Kabba and five other students werearrested and detained for two months, while three lecturers - CleoHancilles, Olu Gordon and Jimmy Kandeh, the original founders of PANAFU- were summarily dismissed from the university without a properexplanation or compensation up to the present day.

35. Some of theexpelled students eventually found their way to Ghana and gainedadmission into the University of Legon . From Ghana , Alie Kabba madefrequent visits to Guinea and Libya and was also a regular visitor tothe People's Bureau (as the Libyan embassy was called) in Accra.According to Olu Gordon:“The idea of the RUF actually came fromthe expelled students from Fourah Bay College, especially Alie Kabba.And the specific reason why it was called a “united front” was becausethey had attempted to draw several organisations into their plan,including the organisations belonging to the Pan African Union(PANAFU).'”

36. Other witnesses, who were part of PANAFU, aswell as some members of the RUF, have challenged the veracity of thistestimony. Indeed, Gordon's account is not entirely accurate, sinceAlie Kabba's umbrella idea went by a different name altogether - thePopular Democratic Front, with the acronym PDF - and had a non-violentagenda for change at its heart. RUF members further pointed out that atthe time the students were in Libya , no name had been chosen for themovement they joined. The name RUF was coined by others in Libya andhad no direct connection to PANAFU, which had by that time becomedetached from the revolutionary project.

Divergence of Youths and the Spiral into Violent Rebellion

37. The exiled students raised the idea with PANAFU in Freetown of sendingmembers of their revolutionary “cells” in the city to undertaketraining programmes in Libya . Four trainees nominated by PANAFU leftfor Libya during the rainy season of 1987. By the time they returned in1988, leading members of PANAFU were no longer committed to therevolutionary project, which led to a split in the movement. One groupwent underground and carried on planning for new batches of trainees,recruiting mainly marginalised youths from the city.

38.PANAFU's withdrawal from the revolutionary project starved it ofideologically educated youths and turned it into what one writer hasdescribed as:“an individual enterprise… any man (no attempt wasmade to recruit women) who felt the urge to acquire insurgency trainingin the service of the “revolution” [could join up]… This inevitablyopened the way for the recruitment of lumpens.”

39. Alie Kabbahad assumed the position of co-ordinator of the “revolution” because ofhis pre-existing links with Libya . Many trainees were opposed toKabba's leadership, though. They objected to his personal refusal toundergo military training. They also accused him and his friends inGhana of “sitting on millions of dollars” and benefiting from theirrecruitment for training in Libya . By the time Kabba left Ghana forLibya, most of the trainees had revolted. The bulk of them had returnedto Sierra Leone by 1989 or 1990 and never assumed roles in the RUFmovement, or indeed in any of the factions that fought in the conflict.

40. Divergence of paths and purposes occurred during the time of thetraining in Libya . Sierra Leone 's original student revolutionariesrealised they had little in common with some of their countrymen whotrained on the camps near Tripoli . Alie Kabba and Cleo Hancilles, thetwo ideological driving forces, grew wary of the direction theirproject had assumed and decided to opt out. Into the resultantleadership vacuum stepped Foday Sankoh, an aggrieved former soldier ofthe Sierra Leone Army who was an anomalous, older presence among themostly youthful trainees. In Libya , Sankoh met Charles Taylor, theleader of the Liberian trainees on the camp. The two men forged a jointplan for insurgencies in their respective countries, starting inLiberia and moving into Sierra Leone . From that moment on, the courseof the “revolution” - and with it the destiny of the sub-region's youth- changed irreversibly. Sankoh and a handful of cohorts made their wayto Liberia and joined an insurgency alongside Taylor 's NPFL. Among theyouths involved, only Abu Kanu, a graduate of Njala University College ,had reached a level of higher education comparable to the originalPANAFU-led group of the mid-1980s.

41. Foday Sankoh began toassemble more fighters for his RUF rebellion in 1990. He used CharlesTaylor's NPFL bases and logistics to train Sierra Leoneans from diversebackgrounds who had been caught up in the turmoil in Liberia . Some weremigrant workers whom Sankoh plucked from prisons in NPFL control areas;others were marginalised urban youths and common criminals. They becameknown as the RUF “vanguards”. In March and April 1991, the vanguardsentered Sierra Leone with a troop of NPFL commandos who outnumberedthem by about four to one. The Sierra Leone conflict had begun, withyouths from unlikely and unsettled circumstances very much to the fore.

42. After the launch of the armed rebellion, most of the youths who joinedthe RUF, or who were compelled to join the organisation, weremarginalised rural youths. Thus different categories of youths wereinvolved at distinct stages of the conflict history of Sierra Leone.Educated youths were involved in the formulation of ideas forrevolution and regime change, instigating the training in Libya.Marginalised urban youths were involved in the bulk of the militarytraining and the launch of the insurgency. Thereafter the bulk of thegrowing manpower of the RUF consisted of marginalised rural youths.

43. Youths who joined the RUF could be further distinguished according tothose who joined voluntarily and those who were forced to join. Some ofthe youths who joined willingly were won over by the simplisticrhetoric of the movement and believed that their involvement would helpto reform “the system” that had oppressed them for so long. They werefed up with the APC and wanted a change of government. According to aresident of Pujehun District:“We assembled at the barray andthey addressed us… “We have come to make Sierra Leone a better SierraLeone… Sierra Leoneans are suffering… education is expensive… we havecome to get rid of the APC rule”… After their address, we were happyand prepared food for them… They appointed a town commander… Some ofthem left after they had finished eating.”

44. However, whetherby choice or against their will, practically all the recruits soonadopted forms of behaviour that characterised marginalised youths -drug addiction and violence. Involvement in the rebellion itself becamean alienating and marginalising process. RUF and NPFL atrocities inSierra Leone soon drew contempt and opposition from the communitiesthey were attempting to win over. Youths who had joined the insurgencybecame completely alienated from their own people, either due to actsin which they participated personally or due to their association withthe outrages perpetrated by the movement as a whole.

45. Theinvolvement of youth in the conflict became infinitely more complicatedin April 1992, when a band of youths in the Sierra Leone Army overthrewthe APC in a coup and formed a military junta known as the NPRC. In anattempt to counter the insurgents at the warfront, the NPRC engaged inmass recruitment of marginalised urban youths into the Army. By 1992,therefore, almost the entire combatant population consisted of youths,on both sides of the battle.

46. It should be recalled that bythe eve of the conflict most urban youth had lost all hope. They hadsunk into an abyss of unemployment and disillusionment. In this state,fighting in the war seemed a viable alternative. It presented a meansthrough which youths could possibly break out of their despair andtransform their lives. Many youth aligned themselves with one or moreof the factions and swiftly achieved what they considered progress:they were able to accrue “wealth” and “status” that otherwise wouldhave been unattainable.

47. More youths joined the war when theysaw how “profitable” the experience had proved for others. Instead ofenduring long periods of unemployment, they looted money and goods.Rather than possessing no stake in society, no property and no hope forthe future, they became “commandos” who could acquire guns, sex, foodand drugs at their will. The opportunity cost of going to war was verylow. War empowered them. Inevitably, such youths began to perceivepersonal benefits in the continuation of conflict. Across all factionsthey became the most vocal constituency resisting efforts to end thewar.

48. Some youths joined the armed factions in order to carryout personal vendettas. Statements from Pujehun District indicate thatsome of the earliest recruits into the RUF on its Southern Front weremilitiamen who had participated in the so-called Ndorgboryosoirebellion against the APC government in the early 1980s, but ultimatelyfailed. The Commission also heard testimonies from various parts of thecountry about youths who had been ostracised from their communities inthe past, only to return during war to lead fighters into attackingtheir people, destroying their communities and humiliating theirchiefs, elders and members of their traditional authorities.

The Re-convergence of Youths

49. In the late 1970s and 1980s, there had been a convergence of theeducated and the uneducated marginalised youths. This convergenceinitiated discourse on modes and means of resistance, or violence, thatcould be targeted at the perpetrator of their marginalisation - the APCgovernment. Their discourse took place in the potes, against thebackground of a non-conflict environment.

50. In contrast, there-convergence of youths in the 1990s took place in the course of theactual rebellion against the state. On this occasion the youths whoconverged were mainly uneducated and marginalised youths who had joinedthe RUF or the Army. Those in the Army were largely marginalised urbanyouths, whilst the RUF constituted mainly rural youths. It became aconvergence of all the groups from the pre-conflict period describedearlier in this chapter: rarray man dem; upline savis man dem; san sanboys; and njiahungbia ngornga.

51. Youths in both the Army andthe RUF shared common traits of marginalisation. Most were uneducated,heavy users of drugs and had been uprooted or alienated from theirpre-war communities. The rebellion and counter-insurgency seemed topromise marginalised youths that they could continue to engage in theirold habits while fulfilling the ambitions that were denied to them bysociety.

52. Towards this end youths were encouraged by theleadership of the various military and political factions. The eliteswere profiteering from war in different ways from the youths, but theyhad a similar interest in its perpetuation. Youths in turn utilisedviolence not only to please their masters, but also to fulfil theiryearnings for material acquisitions. In other words, the youthsappropriated elite-sanctioned violence for subaltern ends.

53. Thus the eventual re-convergence of marginalised youths in the midst ofthe brutality that characterised the conflict was perhaps inevitable.Some commentators believe that the neologism “sobel” captures thisconvergence, because soldiers behaved like rebels, and vice versa. Thereality is subtly different, however, since the union of the RUF withthe AFRC regime that seized power in May 1997 came about through adecision of their respective leaderships, rather then any organicmerger of the two combatant cadres on the ground. Only upon theirconvergence did the two factions really appreciate that they werepractically identical in their composition.

54. The leaders ofthe Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) came from subalternsocial types (rarray man dem) who had become accustomed to deployingviolence on behalf of the civilian political elites. In seizing powerin their coup of 1997, these soldiers and civilians were carrying outviolence towards their own ends and in doing so they made nodistinction between public and private targets.

55. When theAFRC regime was joined by the RUF, itself composed mainly ofmarginalised rural youths, many ordinary people suspected that itreflected years of collaboration between the two factions at thebattlefront. It was very common to hear Sierra Leoneans saying thatthey knew that the RUF and the Army were secret lovers and that theywere now publicly celebrating the marriage. It was not so much aquestion of formalising an existing relationship, though, as ofwondering why the two of them had failed to get together earlier.

Community Self-Defence and the Utilisation of Youths

56. In the mid to late 1990s, civilian communities largely lost faith inthe national army and sponsored their own youths to become members ofthe Civil Defence Forces, a militia network dominated by Kamajors fromthe south and east. For many youths, joining the Kamajors was a way toearn respectability and honour. Others simply heeded the call of theirelders to be initiated:“The chiefdom elders called upon theyouths of all the surrounding villages and explained to us that sincethe situation was getting out of hand, they want some of the youths tovolunteer to be initiated into the Kamajor society as a means ofself-defence. Eighty people were registered for initiation.”

57. In his statement to the Commission, another youth said he joined theKamajors to defend his people from soldiers and the RUF:“Thegovernment soldiers who were supposed to protect us were the very oneswho were killing and harassing our people. The RUF were also killingour people and burning our houses.”

58. The CDF militias startedas a reaction to the abuses of the RUF and government soldiers. As thewar progressed, though, the CDF was transformed into much more than acommunity defence force. This was particularly the case after the 1997AFRC coup, when the CDF became an armed force dedicated to therestoration of the SLPP government. According to one CDF fighter:“Inaddition to the carnage and destruction caused by the rebels to ourpeople and the land, for these kind of people to rule us was a mockeryand a shame… My first deployment (as a Kamajor) was to go and fight theRUF at their base in Koribundo.”

59. As tensions flared, manyKamajor members learned to use the war for private gain. Although theywere under oaths, taboos and a disciplined code of conduct that forbadethem from engaging in certain acts, they nonetheless looted, raped,killed innocent civilians and conscripted children into their ranks.

60. A farmer from Pujehun recounted his ordeal at the hands of the Kamajors:“EightKamajors attacked me on my farm. They invited me to their base, but Irefused to accompany them. They maltreated me and while I sat on theground they fired shots around me. As if that was not enough, they wenton to harvest my pineapple and other fruits. Finally, they looted allmy property and burnt down my farmhouse.”

61. Membership of theKamajors was in some areas the only way of avoiding such abuses. Manyyouths joined the militia to seek this protective cover:“TheseKamajors intimidated us so much as civilians that I decided to jointhem in 1997. I did it to gain the freedom of entering and leaving ourvillage.”

Youths as Collaborators in the Conflict

62. In addition to their active combat roles, youths instigated horrificatrocities by collaborating with the factions in times of socialtension or when control of a particular area changed hands. Youths wereoften the first residents to be sought out for information or localknowledge. By betraying the confidence of their communities andpointing fingers, sometimes without any rational basis, they causedmany deaths and untold suffering:“When the soldiers recapturedPotoru… an indigene of Potoru showed the soldiers all the houses therebels had been dwelling in… The houses were then burnt down by an SLAcorporal…”

63. When the war broke out in the east and the south,some young men who joined the RUF pointed out to rebel forces certainindividuals they perceived as their antagonists or oppressors. Oftenthese persons were tortured and killed. During the ousting of the juntain 1998 by the ECOMOG intervention force, irate youths not only formed“mobs” to beat up and summarily execute civilians, they also identifiedsuspected AFRC sympathisers or disclosed their hideouts to ECOMOGpersonnel and Kamajors, who dealt mercilessly with their victims.Philip Sankoh described what happened to him:“Around 16February 1998, a neighbour named Modupeh came with a group of Nigeriansoldiers serving under ECOMOG… The soldiers attacked my friend and I…and held us at gun point … That same night they went over to the placewhere I had gone to seek refuge… and harassed the people, looted theirproperty.”

The Impact of the Conflict on Youth

64. Instead of alleviating the neglect and marginalisation believed to bethe prime causes of the war, the eleven-year conflict has actuallycompounded the problems faced by youths and had entirely negativeconsequences on their development. Many youths have been leftdisillusioned and frustrated.

Youths and education

65. A whole generation of youths lost their opportunity to advance theirlevels of education, which is so vital to the improvement of theirstatus. Desmond Massaquoi recounted the circumstances that have deniedhim his schooling:“I was attending Christ The King College whenthe war broke out; I was in form three. I went for holidays to myvillage Kanguma, near Serabu in the Bumpeh Chiefdom. Rebels attacked myvillage, burnt our houses, looted our property and killed some people.Amongst those killed were my father, my sister and her husband. Thesepeople were the ones paying my school fees… I want to continue myeducation but there is no one to support me as my sister and herhusband who supported me are dead.'”

66. Displacement of thepopulation resulted in high levels of illiteracy and a massive drop inthe standard of education. As civilians sought refuge in the big towns,overcrowding meant that schools had to begin operating double shifts.Class sizes increased and the quality of interaction in the learningenvironment deteriorated. Even the few youths who were able to attendschool received a lower quality of education. Many had their educationhalted abruptly by their enlistment into the fighting forces orabduction by the RUF.
67. In post-conflict Sierra Leone manyyouths who lost out on schooling believe they are now too old to returnto school. They are destined to remain unskilled. Many are not justunemployed; they are unemployable. They can be seen all over thecountry, many of them begging and stealing in order to survive.

Psychosocial effects of the conflict

68. Many youths were brutalised and transformed into killing machines. Theyhave been deprived of the positive aspects of their youth. Some youngpeople were abducted as children and stayed with their captorsthroughout the eleven-year conflict. Many others lost parents andbenefactors. In general youths remain bereft of the stabilising ties ofaffection, intimacy and emotional support. Denied these ties, they arevulnerable to emotional and psychological insecurity.

Drugs

69. Before the war, most youths consuming drugs used cannabis. During thewar, they were introduced to more dangerous narcotics such as cocaineand heroin. There has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of youngdrug takers and the types of drugs they are addicted to.

Loss of civic and social skills

70. The breakdown of community norms and socialisation during the ten-yearcivil conflict created youths without civic or social skills. Those inthe fighting forces were inducted into a life of burning, looting andkilling. They do not possess peacetime skills and are finding itdifficult to accept and accede to authority. Refugees also had theirlives disrupted. Thus many among them lack the social, civic andeconomic skills necessary for a disciplined peacetime life.

71. Youths have become been used to violence as a means of resolvingproblems. Many still hold onto the belief that they should resort toviolence to get what they need. They have been used to committingviolations with impunity.

Limited livelihood skills

72. Destruction of infrastructure has impacted negatively on the range andavailability of economic opportunities. Displacement meant abandoningfarms and other commercial activities. Always on the run or in thefight, youths could not generate productive skills that were relevantto sustaining livelihoods in rural or urban settings. Many of them areat a loss as to how to rebuild their shattered livelihoods after theconflict. Lahai Kamara told the Commission:“I am discouraged because I do not know when I will be able to rebuild my life and be able to recover from my loss.”

Unemployment

73. Unemployment among the youth remains a major problem. The economy wasdestroyed during the ten-year conflict and as a result few jobs areavailable. Even where jobs are available, many youths do not have therequired skills.

74. Every year hundreds of young peoplegraduate from the university and have to scrounge and scramble for thevery few jobs on offer. Ex-combatants who have learnt skills cannotfind employment and are eking out a living as petty traders. Manyyouths sit around the streets and motor parks idling their time away.

Post-Conflict Efforts at addressing the Youth Question

Ministry of Youth and Sports

75. At the end of the conflict the government decided to give prominence tothe youth question by creating a separate youth ministry. Thegovernment de-linked the responsibility for Youth and Sports from theformer Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports because the youth andsports component was being dwarfed by the education component. Aspecific ministry with specific responsibilities for Youth and Sportswas created in 2002.
76. One of the initiatives taken by the newministry was the publishing of the Sierra Leone National Youth Policy,which was approved and launched by the government in July 2003. Throughthis policy the government hopes to empower youths not only to makethem responsible citizens but also as an investment in Sierra Leone'sfuture.
77. A programme of action for youth development hasemerged from the National Youth Policy. It focuses to a large extent onthe economic empowerment of youths. The ministry has recognised thefact that many young people have missed out on their youthful years.The action plan is an effort to do something to restore to them some ofthe benefits of youth.
78. The programme is faced with a numberof constraints, however. The first is the lack of financial support torealise its objectives. Second, there are few well-trained peopleinvolved in youth work and the ministry finds it difficult to attractskilled administrators and organisers. The ministry is further facedwith the challenge of convincing people that the youth question is now,more than ever, a national priority that demands national mobilisation.
79. Although the youth question has been declared as a priority in thepolicy and in the public speeches of government officials, it has beenvery difficult to translate such declarative emphasis into practicalimpact. This deficiency is symptomatic of the continued marginalisationof the youth. What obtains is a prioritisation of youth at the abstractlevel, with few tangible benefits for youths themselves.
80. Youths had wanted the policy enacted into law in an effort to make itsprovisions binding on the government. The policy was however launchedwithout an effort to give effect to this demand. A golden opportunitywas therefore missed.

The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)

81. The NCDDR was established in July 1998 to disarm anddemobilise combatants of the RUF, CDF and SLA (AFRC) and support theirreintegration into society.

82. Disarmament and demobilisationof ex-combatants was completed in 2002. As a way of providing analternative to the fighting life, make up for the time lost in the bushand in order to reintegrate them into society, the programme supportedmore than 25,000 ex-combatants to learn various trades and skills. Morethan 7,000 ex-combatants were placed in the formal education system atsecondary, tertiary and technical vocational levels. Some of theseyouths are already using their acquired skills to help rebuild theircommunities, thereby promoting the reconciliation and reintegrationaspect of the programme.

83. As part of its reintegration work,the NCDDR worked closely with implementing partners - community-basedorganisations and local NGOs - to curb animosity against ex-combatantsthrough the implementation of various reconciliation projects.Consequently, community members have minimised their open animositytowards ex-combatants.
84. Nonetheless, a major constraint thatis faced by many youths who have gone through the demobilisation andskills-building programme of the NCDDR is the poor state of thecountry's economy, which hinders the translation of their skills intopractices that can sustain their livelihoods. The “crash course” natureof the skills-building exercise can be questioned. Many ex-combatantsleft the training programmes inadequately trained or lacking thenecessary discipline to apply what they had learned. Many publictransport users regard ex-combatants who qualified as drivers, theso-called “DDR drivers”, as highly undisciplined.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

85. Many NGOs sprang up in response to the acutehumanitarian crisis in the country. Through education, sensitisationand awareness-raising programmes, they have been able to reach out andpropagate constructive messages to a wide constituency across thecountry. Ex-combatants and non-combatants alike have benefited from awide range of assistance and empowerment programmes. Of particularinterest with regard to this chapter, a whole new sector of the NGOcommunity has evolved around the youth question.

86. Many NGOsworking with youth have specific aims and objectives (such as humanrights, skills training and empowerment), but they all share a commongoal - to transform youths into capable members of society. NGOsserving youths, however, must overcome a variety of obstacles incarrying out their work, including the perennial issue of resourceshortages. Most NGOs access funds for programme implementation fromdonors outside of Sierra Leone . They have not been able to generatefunds locally. Donor support in turn is inherently erratic. Donorpriorities may change before the programme goals for youth work aremet, leading to the abrupt end of the programmes.

87. Most NGOsdepend on the services of volunteers because they lack funds to paytheir staff adequate remuneration. Many volunteers have othercommitments that make them less effective on the job. The youth NGOsector requires considerable further investment if it is to become aviable contributor to the social, political and economic development ofthe country's youths.

Conclusion

88. Sierra Leone has witnessed what the lethal cocktail of youthmarginalisation and political manipulation can produce. Youths who hadlearnt to do the violent bidding of their masters soon applied theseskills to further their own ends.

89. Hitherto mainstream youths- university students and graduates - were increasingly marginalisedamidst the deteriorating political and economic environment of the1970s. These youths linked up with the marginalised uneducated andunemployed youth, bringing with them ideas of “revolution” as a meansof ending their marginal existence. Once the armed struggle hadcommenced many youths exploited the conflict for private gain. The warprovided a useful cover for them to enrich themselves. Their lootingcampaigns made no distinction between private and public property, nordid their violence distinguish between combatants and ordinarycivilians. As a result massive human rights violations and abuses wereperpetrated by youths during the war.

90. Youths becameparticipants in a conflict that entrenched their marginalisation.Inducted into a life of violent but unsustainable accumulation, theyundermined the very attributes - schools, state resources, skills ofcivic interaction - they needed to escape their marginalisation.
91. In order properly to address the youth question, the means to escapeyouth marginalisation must be rebuilt and sustained. This nationaleffort must include providing the skills to youths to participateproductively in the economy. It also means encouraging the rightattitudes. Youths themselves must be integral to the planning andimplementation of youth-orientated policies and programmes. Theconstruction of sustainable youth programmes can only be done throughauthentic dialogue between youths and their elders. As these processesunfold, it will become incumbent on the youth to demonstrateresponsibility, leadership and accountability. In so doing, SierraLeone's youth will at last come closer to finding its rightful place in society.

Burundians arrive to understudy UNIOSIL

Abdul Karim Koroma 15/5/2006

A high-powered delegation from the Republic of Burundi is in the country for a week to undertake a comprehensive study of the work of the United Nations Integrated Office In Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), a release from that institution states. “The objective of the mission is to obtain a comprehensive idea of the work of the UNIOSIL and its operations on the ground, from the perspective of the United Nations, the government of Sierra Leone as well as the country's international partners,” the statement states and added that further more the their aim is to gain a clear understanding of the added value and advantage of an Integrated Office, as well as the challenges and constraints of such a structure in supporting national efforts to consolidate peace and the development of the country. The release stated that the Mission would also be interested in seeing some visible results of the work of the Integrated Office including the schemes facilitated or implemented under the umbrella of UNIOSIL. “While in Sierra Leone , the delegation will meet with senior officials of the government, officials of civil society organizations and members of the diplomatic corps,” the release states.